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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
This appeal requires us to decide whether a Philadelphia 
Ordinance that prohibits employers from inquiring into a 
prospective employee’s wage history in setting or negotiating 
that employee’s wage violates the First Amendment. The 
district court held the Ordinance unconstitutional insofar as it 
prohibits that inquiry. However, the court upheld the provision 
of the Ordinance that prohibits reliance on wage history based 
on the court’s conclusion that such reliance did not implicate 
protected speech.  
 
For the reasons that below, we affirm the court’s order insofar 
as it upholds the Reliance Provision but reverse it insofar as it 
strikes down the Inquiry Provision.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 2017, the City of Philadelphia enacted an ordinance to 
address the disparity in the pay of women and minorities that 
is often called the “pay gap.” The Ordinance contains two 
provisions: the “Inquiry Provision,” which prohibits an 
employer from asking about a prospective employee’s wage 
history, and the “Reliance Provision,” which prohibits an 
employer from relying on wage history at any point in the 
process of setting or negotiating a prospective employee’s 
wage. The Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce filed 
this suit, individually and on behalf of some of its members, 
alleging that both provisions of the Ordinance infringe on the 
freedom of speech of the Chamber and its members.  
The Chamber concedes that the pay gap exists, and that the 
City has a substantial governmental interest in addressing it. 
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However, the Chamber argues that the City passed the 
Ordinance “with only the barest of legislative records” and, 
therefore, did not present sufficient evidence to establish that 
the Ordinance would satisfy the City’s objective.1 
Accordingly, the Chamber claims that the Ordinance cannot 
survive its First Amendment challenge under either strict or 
intermediate scrutiny.  
 
The district court agreed that the Inquiry Provision violated the 
First Amendment speech rights of employers and invalidated 
that part of the Ordinance. But the court concluded that the 
Reliance Provision withstood the Chamber’s First Amendment 
challenge because it did not impact speech.   
 
As we explain below, we conclude that the district court erred 
in holding that the Inquiry Provision was unconstitutional. We 
believe the court’s analysis of that provision applied a much 
higher standard than required. The Supreme Court has not 
demanded that the enacting authority achieve legislative 
certainty or produce empirical proof that the adopted 
legislation would achieve the stated interest even when 
applying strict scrutiny. Rather, the appropriate inquiry 
requires courts to determine whether the legislature “has drawn 
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.”2 The 
Supreme Court has even “permitted litigants to justify 
[analogous] speech restrictions by reference to studies and 
anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in 
a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based 
solely on history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’”3 In 
 
1 Chamber Br. at 1. 
2 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) 
(“Turner II”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
3 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) 
(internal citations omitted). See also City Br. at 43-44 (citing 
Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 92 (3d Cir. 2014), WV Ass’n 
of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 
F.3d 292, 303–04 (4th Cir. 2009), Coyote Pub., Inc. v. Miller, 
598 F.3d 592, 608 (9th Cir. 2010) (illustrating recent 
decisions reflecting the Supreme Court’s flexible approach to 
speech restrictions under intermediate scrutiny. As we explain 
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short, the Supreme Court has upheld similar restrictions based 
on much less evidence than the City presented here.   
 
A. The Disparity And The Ordinance 
According to the 2015 census, women in Pennsylvania earned 
79 cents for every dollar earned by similarly situated men.4 For 
women of color, the wage gap is even more profound. Black 
women earn 68 cents for every dollar paid to similarly situated 
men, and Latina women earn 56 cents for every dollar paid to 
similarly situated men.5 The gap begins for women as soon as 
they enter the workforce. In just the first year after college, full-
time working women earn, on average, just 82% of what their 
male peers earn.6 Overall, women under the age of 35 earn 88-
91% of what their male peers earn.7 Rather than improve, as 
women gain experience in the work force the situation gets 
worse. Women aged 35 and over earn only 77-81% of what 
male peers earn.8  
 
In response to this persistent wage disparity, the City of 
Philadelphia enacted the Ordinance at the center of this 
dispute. The Ordinance states:  
 
It is an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . .  
 
below, we conclude that the Ordinance need only satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny.) 
4 See JA119–20 (discussing the City Council’s legislative 
findings supporting the Ordinance). 
5 Id. 
6 See, e.g., Christianne Corbett & Catherine Hill, Am. Ass’n 
of Univ. Women (“AAUW”), Graduating to a Pay Gap: The 
Earnings of Women and Men One Year After College 
Graduation, at 9 (Oct. 2012), 
https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/graduating-to-a-pay-gap-
the-earnings-of-women-and-men-one-year-after-college-
graduation.pdf. 
7 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Highlights of Women’s 
Earnings in 2017, at 9 (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-
earnings/2017/pdf/home.pdf. 
8 Id. 
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(i) To inquire about a prospective employee’s 
wage history, require disclosure of wage history, 
or condition employment or consideration for an 
interview or employment on disclosure of wage 
history, or retaliate against a prospective 
employee for failing to comply with any wage 
history inquiry.  
 
(ii) To rely on the wage history of a prospective 
employee from any current or former employer 
of the individual in determining the wages for 
such individual at any stage in the employment 
process, including the negotiation or drafting of 
any employment contract, unless such applicant 
knowingly and willingly disclosed his or her 
wage history to the employer, employment 
agency, employee or agent thereof.  
 
(c) For purposes of this Section 9-1131, “to 
inquire” shall mean to ask a job applicant in 
writing or otherwise. . . . 9 
 
Employers who violate the Ordinance are subject to 
civil and criminal penalties, including compensatory 
damages, up to $2,000 in punitive damages per 
violation, and an additional $2,000 and 90 days’ 
incarceration for a repeat offense.10 
 
B. Legislative Background 
The City seeks to justify the Ordinance by relying on the 
testimony of witnesses who testified before the City Council 
prior to the enactment of the Ordinance and an affidavit by Dr. 
Janice Madden that the City submitted to the district court in 
response to the Chamber’s constitutional challenge. Dr. 
Madden reviewed thousands of peer-reviewed research studies 
and concluded, among other things, that “there is wage 
discrimination in the labor market, suppressing the prior wages 
 
9 Phila. Code § 9-1131. 
10 Id. §§ 9-1105(1)(c)–(d), 9-1121(2). 
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of women and minorities” and this “is consistent with the 
findings of thousands of research studies.”11 She concluded 
that “these scholarly studies show . . . that significant and 
substantial wage differentials by race and gender, which are 
not explained by credentials or qualification, persist.”12 The 
Chamber presented no evidence challenging any of Dr. 
Madden’s conclusions or the studies those conclusions were 
based on.  
 
1. Testimony Before the City Council  
 
a. Barbara Price 
 
Barbara Price, the Public Policy Chair of the American 
Association of University Women, testified before the Council 
and submitted written testimony. She reiterated that “the 
[wage] gap still exists today at 80 cents nationally and 79 cents 
for Pennsylvania, which ranks [Pennsylvania] 27th as a state in 
the country.”13 She confirmed that “[t]he gap remains 
consistent across age groups, levels of education, and for full-
time workers across a number of occupations.”14 She discussed 
research that showed, after accounting for choice of 
occupation, hours worked, economic sector, experience, grade 
point average, undergraduate institution, marital status and 
other factors, a significant gap between the earnings of men 
and women remained—beginning one year after graduation 
and widening in the years thereafter.15 For example, in 
 
11 JA297. 
12 JA298 (emphasis added). 
13 Council of the City of Philadelphia Committee on Law and 
Government: Hearing on Bill No. 160840, (Nov. 22, 2016) 
(hereinafter “Hearing Transcript” or “Hr’g Tr.”) at 70, 
available at 
http://legislation.phila.gov/transcripts/Public%20Hearings/la
wngov/2016/lg112216.pdf; see also JA272-277. 
14 JA273. 
15 JA275 (citing AAUW, The Simple Truth About the Gender 
Pay Gap, at 17 (Fall 2014), 
https://fortunedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/the-
simple-truth_fall.pdf (“After accounting for college major, 
occupation, economic sector, hours worked, months 
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Philadelphia, “[t]he single most common occupation for 
Latinas is that of maids, housekeepers, janitors or building 
cleaners where they make up 22 percent of the people 
employed in those jobs.”16 However, “Latinas who work full 
time in these occupations, year round, are paid just 58 cents for 
every dollar paid to White, non-Hispanic men in the same 
occupations.”17 She testified that the pay gap “costs a typical 
woman in Pennsylvania about $918,120 over the course of her 
career.”18  
b. Terry Fromson 
 
Terry L. Fromson, the Managing Attorney for the Women’s 
Law Project, testified before the City Council that the practice 
of obtaining and using wage history to set pay is one 
contributor to the pay gap.19 She told the City Council that “a 
sizable wage gap exists between men and women in 
Pennsylvania, one that is substantially larger for women of 
color.”20 She testified that unequal pay “has persisted despite 
the existence of equal pay laws banning sex discrimination [in] 
wages for five decades.”21  
 
She explained that discrepancy in pay continues, in part, 
because current laws targeting discrimination, such as “the 
Equal Pay Act[,] specifically[] allow[] employers to justify 
paying women less than men based on what is described as a 
factor other than sex.”22 Ms. Fromson explained that “many 
courts have interpreted prior wages as a factor other than sex, 
when in fact, it is typically not. It is not gender neutral.”23 She 
 
unemployed since graduation, GPA, type of undergraduate 
institution, institution selectivity, age, geographical region, 
and marital status, Graduating to a Pay Gap found that a 7 
percent difference in the earnings of male and female college 
graduates one year after graduation was still unexplained.”).   
16 JA273. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 JA268; see also H’rg Tr. at 63-69.  
20 H’rg Tr. at 65. 
21 Id. at 65–66. 
22 Id. at 66. 
23 Id. 
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elaborated, “[a] woman’s prior pay may very well be based on 
a sex discriminatory assessment of her worth. It reflects 
historical market forces based on sex stereotypes and 
assumptions about the value of the equal work of one sex over 
the other.”24 
 
Fromson also gave a detailed explanation of how wage history 
perpetuates and institutionalizes wage discrimination. “Wage 
policies challenged in recent years show how this happens.”25 
One’s initial salary at a given employer is based in part upon 
the salary of the employee’s most recent job. “The wage gap 
data tells us that the woman’s salary is most likely less than the 
man who is equally situated to her.”26 Subsequent pay is then 
based on that starting salary “plus an increment that would be 
applied equally to the men and the women. . . . [E]very time a 
salary increase happens, an equal percentage of prior pay is 
applied. And so, women . . . remain paid less than men.”27 In 
other words, the initial discrepancy in pay is baked into all 
future pay increases, even in workplaces in which pay is 
increased at the same percentage for similarly situated men and 
women.  
 
Fromson told the Council: “[b]y specifically outlawing the 
practice of relying on prior wages to set a new employee’s pay, 
this [O]rdinance will provide clarity that will relieve women of 
having to gamble on whether a court will properly interpret this 
practice as unlawful” discrimination.28 It will therefore help 
ensure that wage growth and wage decisions are based on 
qualifications and job requirements “rather than a factor that 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 66–67 (emphasis added). This testimony does not 
distinguish between salary and wage discrepancy and the text 
of the Ordinance refers only to a wage discrepancy. However, 
we can discern no significant distinction for the purposes of 
our discussion and much of the testimony strongly suggests 
that the compensation gap that Fromson and others referred to 
for salaries is indistinguishable from the compensation gap in 
wages. 
27 Id. at 67. 
28 Id. 
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likely reflects longstanding gender-based wage disparities in 
the labor market.”29 She also noted that the EEOC recognizes 
prior salaries of job candidates can reflect sex-based 
compensation discrimination.30  
 
Fromson informed the Council that Massachusetts had 
approved a similar ban on inquiries into wage history and New 
York City had adopted an executive order to that effect insofar 
as public employees were concerned.31 She added that similar 
legislation was then pending in several jurisdictions including 
New Jersey, the District of Columbia, and New York City (to 
expand to all employers in the city and not just municipal 
employers).32  
 
Fromson also suggested that the Council consider adding two 
clarifications to the proposed Ordinance based on provisions in 
the Massachusetts law and New York City executive order. 
The first provision would have prohibited employers from 
seeking an employee’s wage history from current or former 
employees. She noted that “while [the Ordinance] prohibits an 
employer from asking a job applicant for wage history, it does 
not bar inquiries directly to current and former employers.”33 
The second suggested change was to allow reliance on wage 
history after an offer of employment and compensation had 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 66. 
31 Id. at 64. 
32 Id. The state of New Jersey has since passed a similar wage 
history inquiry and reliance ban. See Act of July 25, 2019, 
Pub. L. No. 2019, c.199 (N.J. 2019). That act states: “it shall 
be an unlawful employment practice for any employer: (1) to 
screen a job applicant based on the applicant’s salary history, 
including, but not limited to, the applicant’s prior wages, 
salaries or benefits; or (2) to require that the applicant’s salary 
history satisfy any minimum or maximum criteria.” As 
Fromson’s testimony suggests, New Jersey’s recently enacted 
law appears to be part of an emerging trend that recognizes 
the extent to which reliance on wage history inevitably 
perpetuates historic wage disparity. 
33 H’rg Tr. at 68. 
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been made.34 She explained that without the second change, the 
proposed legislation allowed employers to consider wage 
history if the employee volunteered it before an offer was 
made.35 Fromson suggested that this “place[d] applicants in an 
untenable position of having to choose between protecting 
what is biased information that may adversely affect their 
future wages or [] risk being denied a job.”36 In her opinion, 
that was “an inherently coercive situation for someone to be 
in.”37  
 
Ultimately, these added provisions were not incorporated into 
the Ordinance. Councilman William Greenlee, Chairman of 
the Committee of Law and Government, noted that, in 
declining to include these added provisions, the Philadelphia 
Ordinance did not go as far as other proposed wage history 
bans around the country. He told the committee, “the 
Massachusetts law goes a little wider than we do. We’re trying 
to keep it real basic[;] . . . you’ll hear from a witness that thinks 
we don’t make it strong enough, but we’re trying to find that 
great balance that we always try to in legislation. . . .”38 We are 
trying “at this point [to] limit it to stopping the employer from 
asking, directly asking, the prospective employee what they 
make.”39 He also noted “for the record, as far as the Chamber 
of Commerce goes, the Boston Chamber of Commerce 
supported the Massachusetts law. . . . [T]hey obviously did not 
believe it was that injurious to businesses.”40 
 
c. Marianne Bellesorte 
 
Marianne Bellesorte, Vice President of Advocacy at Pathways 
PA,41 analyzed wage gap data and concluded that the wage gap 
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 68–69. 
37 Id. at 69. 
38 Id. at 15. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 80. 
41 “PathWays PA works to end the cycle of poverty, 
homelessness, and abuse in the Philadelphia region.” Id. at 
74. 
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for women and men of color “are compounded” when these 
individuals are asked to share their wage history.42 She told the 
Council “[o]ne step in addressing wage inequality is ensuring 
that a history of low salaries does not follow women into a new 
workplace.”43 She emphasized that “the wage gap is not just 
about women. It is also about people of color, men and 
women.”44 She explained how wage inquiries perpetuate 
discrimination for women and minorities: “Inequitable wages 
start right out of college, and they’re compounded when 
women and [minorities] apply for new jobs and are asked to 
share their pay history. Instead of starting their job on an equal 
footing, they enter with a lower salary because it was based on 
previous employment.”45 She continued: “Not surprisingly as 
women get older, the wage gap continues to grow and 
continues to affect women in retirement.”46  Bellesorte also 
explained: “By preventing potential employers [from] asking 
for salary history, Philadelphia’s workers gain the ability to 
earn what their work is actually worth. A woman who starts 
her career at the low end of a salary range will not be held to 
that standard for the rest of her work life.”47  
 
d. Rue Landau 
 
Rue Landau, the Executive Director of the Philadelphia 
Commission on Human Relations, told the committee that, “as 
the agency charged with enforcing the Fair Practices 
Ordinance . . . the PCHR understand[s] that the wage gap is 
real.”48 According to Ms. Landau, “women working in 
Pennsylvania are paid only 79 cents for every dollar a man 
earns.49 In real numbers, median annual earnings in 
 
42 JA276.  
43 H’rg Tr. at 74. 
44 Id. at 75. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 76. 
48 Id. at 8. 
49 Jovida Hill, the Executive Director of Philadelphia’s 
Commission on Women, affirmed the testimony of Ms. 
Landau with nationwide empirical evidence.  She testified 
that, “[a]ccording to calculations by the National Committee 
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Pennsylvania are $51,212 for a man and $40,742 for a 
woman.”50 She testified “the practice of asking about an 
applicant’s wage history during the hiring process can 
perpetuate wage inequality, low wages, and poverty. . . . [A] 
jobseeker who has suffered from the wage gap can only be 
harmed when required to disclose her salary history.”51 She 
concluded “the PCHR strongly believes[] that taking out any 
obstacles that employers could use . . . to discriminate is a very 
important thing to do. This is one of these barriers.”52  
 
2. Other Testimony Before City Council 
 
The Chamber did not present any witnesses in opposition to the 
Ordinance, but it did submit written testimony from Rob 
Wonderling, President and CEO of the Chamber. He wrote that 
the Ordinance “goes too far in dictating how employers can 
interact with potential hires.”53 Rather surprisingly, he 
submitted that employers use wage history to “have a better 
understanding of whether a candidate is worth pursuing based 
on previous compensation levels as well as the market value or 
salaries for comparable positions.”54 That of course is exactly 
why the City Council was considering the Ordinance. It was 
trying to cut the Gordian knot that continues to tie past 
discriminatory wages to future job opportunities and wages so 
that employers would not decide if a given employee was 
“worth pursuing based on previous compensation levels.” 
Wonderling also asserted that “[i]n speaking with our members 
. . . we hear that compensation decisions are based on a number 
of different factors such as market value, internal equity, 
funding limitations and competition. It is not made based on a 
 
on Pay Equity, for a woman with a high school education, the 
difference [in pay arising from the pay gap] can amount to 
$700,000, $1.2 million for a woman with a college degree, 
and $2 million for women with advanced degrees.” H’rg Tr. 
at 12. 
50 Id. 6. 
51 Id. at 8. 
52 Id. at 23. 
53 JA124.  
54 Id.  
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candidate’s past salary history, gender or race.”55 As discussed 
below, however, this claim was contradicted by the Chamber 
members’ own submissions to the district court in which they 
confirmed that they use wage history to set wages.56  
 
The Chamber offered no testimony to refute the existence of 
the wage gap, the role of discrimination in the wage gap, or the 
conclusion that prohibiting inquiry into one’s wage history 
could help mitigate the wage gap. Based on this record, on 
December 8, 2016, after weighing the testimony and 
submissions, the City Council unanimously passed the 
Ordinance.57  
 
C. The Legal Challenge  
In April 2017, the Chamber filed a Complaint and Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction alleging the Ordinance violated the 
First Amendment.58 The district court dismissed the original 
complaint for lack of standing. The Chamber addressed that 
deficiency in a subsequently filed Amended Complaint and 
refiled Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.59  
The City responded to the Amended Complaint by submitting 
the affidavit of Dr. Janice Madden.60 
 
55 Id. This testimony is also surprising since, if salary history 
is not a factor in setting compensation levels, it is not at all 
clear how employers would be harmed or prejudiced by the 
Inquiry Provision. 
56 See e.g., JA130 (Chamber Member Bittenbender: “Wage 
history information is essential to salary offers in positions 
where Bittenbender is unaware of the market wage.”). 
57 JA283–89. On January 23, 2017, the bill was signed into 
law. JA122.  
58 JA072-117. 
59 JA74. The City has agreed that the Chamber and its 
members have standing to bring suit here. See JA250, ¶ 18; 
see also JA081-117. 
60 See Affidavit of Janice F. Madden, Ph.D. JA291–306. Dr. 
Madden is a labor economist “with extensive experience in 
the analysis of labor markets and, in particular, gender and 
racial differentials in labor markets.” JA292. She attended the 
Wharton School after completing an M.A. and Ph.D. at Duke 
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1. The Madden Affidavit 
 
The City retained Dr. Madden, a highly respected labor 
economist, to summarize the research in each of the following 
areas: (1) the extent to which salaries of qualified job 
applicants have historically differed by race or gender; (2) the 
effect of starting salaries on the overall salary differentials of 
comparable qualified employees by race or gender–
information that can be provided by an applicant’s salary 
history; and (3) whether there are “alternative sources of such 
information” to support the need for, and potential 
effectiveness of, the Ordinance. Her affidavit corroborated the 
testimony of the witnesses who had testified before the City 
Council.61  
She concluded in her affidavit that “there is wage 
discrimination in the labor market[] suppressing the prior 
wages of women and minorities” and that this “is consistent 
with the findings of thousands of research studies.”62 Dr. 
Madden reviewed the research on pay differentials by race and 
 
University and previously earned her B.A. in economics and 
mathematics at the University of Denver. She is a tenured 
faculty member of the University of Pennsylvania and teaches 
undergraduate and graduate “courses dealing with economics, 
labor markets, and . . . relevant statistical methods.” Id. In 
addition, Dr. Madden has authored five books on economics 
and discrimination and has testified as an expert witness in 
over 45 cases in federal and state courts. JA292–93. 
61 Although her affidavit was not before the Council when the 
Ordinance was passed, it was appropriately considered by the 
district court. As we have previously recognized, “[i]f a 
legislative body can produce in court whatever justification is 
required of it under the applicable constitutional doctrine, we 
perceive little to be gained by incurring the expense, effort, 
and delay involved in requiring it to reenact the legislative 
measure after parading its evidence through its legislative 
chamber.” Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 178 
(3d Cir. 1997). The district court was therefore correct in 
“consider[ing] post-enactment evidence offered in support of 
City Council’s decision.” Id. 
62 JA297. 
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gender for workers with equivalent skills and experience. She 
stated that “[h]undreds, possibly thousands, of scholarly 
studies over the years have decomposed the overall gender and 
racial pay gaps into the proportion arising from gender and 
racial differences in experience, education, training, work 
hours, occupations and industries.”63 Madden concluded that 
“these scholarly studies show that the pay gap remains when 
comparing only men and women or minorities and non-
minorities with the same education, experience, training, work 
hours, occupations and industries.”64 These studies found 
“significant and substantial wage differentials by race and 
gender, which are not explained by credentials or qualification, 
persist.”65 
 
Dr. Madden reached several other conclusions based on her 
survey of the voluminous research supporting the need for the 
Ordinance, including that:  
 
• “Labor market researchers are in general 
agreement that women and/or members of racial 
and ethnic minorities have received and 
currently receive lower wages than comparably 
qualified and performing men and/or members 
of majority racial and ethnic groups.”66 
 
• “Antidiscrimination laws, including the Civil 
Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act, have not 
eliminated the lower wages generally received 
by women and minority workers relative to men 
and majority workers of equivalent skill, ability, 
experience, and performance.”67 
 
• “Starting salaries typically differ by race and 
gender for workers of equivalent skills and 
abilities.”68 
 
63 JA298. 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 Id. 
66 JA294. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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• “The available evidence shows that when 
employers do not have access to salary history, 
they easily obtain information on past 
performance and skills of applicants and they 
select hires with this information as effectively 
as those using salary histories.”69 
According to Dr. Madden, denying employers information 
about a perspective employee’s wage history does not deprive 
a perspective employer of information needed to make an 
informed employment decision, including determining an 
appropriate wage. Concomitantly, putting such wage history 
beyond the reach of new employers helps break the 
discriminatory chain linking an employee’s new salary to past 
salaries and any discriminatory judgments that may have 
influenced those past salaries.70 The studies cited in Dr. 
Madden’s affidavit included comprehensive reviews of scores 
of other studies. For example, she cites Stanley and Jarrell who 
performed a meta-regression analysis of fifty-five other studies 
and concluded that there is a “wide consensus that gender wage 
discrimination exists” and the “vast empirical economic 
literature, containing hundreds of studies, reveals that women 
are ‘underpaid’ disproportionate to their observed skills.”71 
That study focused on determining the extent of the reported 
gaps. Dr. Madden also relied upon the research of Blau and 
Kahn, who found in their review of data from 1980 to 2010, 
“an unexplained gender wage gap in each year[’s data].”72 
They explained that the “finding of such an unexplained gap is 
 
69 JA295. 
70 JA305-06. 
71 T.D. Stanley & Stephen B. Jarrell, Gender Wage 
Discrimination Bias? A Meta- 
Regression Analysis, 33 J. Hum. Resources 947, 948 (Fall 
1998) (hereinafter “Stanley & Jarrell”). 
72 Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage 
Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations, 31, NBER Working 
Paper No. 2193, National Bureau for Economic Research 
(2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21913 (published in 55 
J. of Econ. Lit. 789 (2017)) (hereinafter “Blau & Kahn”). 
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fairly standard in the literature” and is “taken as an estimate of 
labor market discrimination.”73  
 
Dr. Madden also cited Wilson and Rodgers who concluded 
“discrimination has consistently played a major role” in “the 
widening of racial wage gaps since 1979.”74 This study focused 
on the minority wage gap and the causes of the gap for specific 
minority sub-groups. It concludes, among other things: 
“Between the Great Recession of 2007–2009 and 2015, gaps 
among new-entrant women expanded more than among any 
other experience/gender group. The same factor that 
dominated prior to 2000—growing labor market 
discrimination—is the primary source of the erosion.”75 
Additionally, “[a]mong black college graduates, growing 
discrimination was essentially the sole cause of the [wage] 
gap’s expansion, far outweighing the advantages black college 
graduates gained as a result of being slightly older (i.e., more 
experienced) than their white counterparts.”76  
 
Her distilled conclusions of these studies were that “labor 
market discrimination continues to contribute to the wage 
gap;” “discriminatory wages persist;” and the “racial wage gap 
[is] increasing.”77 
 
To eliminate the effect of variables other than race or gender 
such as: education, experience, training, occupation, and 
industry, which could explain the wage gap, Madden also cited 
the studies relied on by Blau and Kahn whose reviews focused 
on homogenous populations within the same industry. For 
example, they analyzed studies within a group of lawyers and 
MBAs that were able to control for very detailed 
characteristics, including, for example, grade point averages 
 
73 Id. 
74 Valerie Wilson & William M. Rodgers III, Black-White 
Wage Gaps Expand with Rising Wage Inequality, 4, 
Economic Policy Inst., (September 19, 2016) 
https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/101972.pdf (hereinafter 
“Wilson & Rodgers”). 
75 Id. at 5. 
76 Id. at 27. 
77 JA298 n.3. 
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while in school.78 “The studies of lawyers and MBAs . . . find 
that, even if one accounts for variables related to family status, 
like work force interruption and fewer hours worked, 
unexplained gender earnings differences remain which are 
potentially due to discrimination.”79 Among lawyers, “men 
earned 11 percent more, controlling for an extensive list of 
worker qualifications and other factors, including grades while 
in law school, detailed work history data, and type and size of 
employer.”80 Among MBAs, “men earned nearly 7 percent 
more even accounting for work force interruptions, fewer 
hours worked, and gender differences in business school GPAs 
and finance courses taken.”81  
 
Blau and Kahn also reviewed experimental studies that 
similarly concluded discrimination is a primary cause of the 
wage gap. The authors believed that experiments “provide[] 
particularly persuasive evidence of discrimination . . . 
[because] they offer estimates of the role of discrimination that 
are potentially less contaminated by unmeasured factors.”82 
For example, the authors describe an experimental study that 
not only replicated the gender wage gap in otherwise identical 
candidates, but also showed that starting salaries for women in 
the study were set far lower than the (otherwise identical) male 
candidates. In the experiment, employers reviewed “the 
application materials of (fictitious) [applicants] who[m] they 
were told . . . applied for a science laboratory manager 
position.”83 Study participants “rated the male applicant as 
significantly more competent and suitable for the position than 
the (identical) female applicant. Participants also set a starting 
salary for male applicants that was almost $4,000 higher than 
the salary offered to female applicants and offered more career 
mentoring to the male applicants.”84 Blau and Kahn conclude 
this research “strongly suggests that discrimination cannot be 
 
78 Blau & Kahn at 32. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 33. 
84 Id. 
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discounted as contributing to the persistent gender wage 
gap.”85  
 
In addition to synthesizing the conclusions reached in various 
studies, some of which are highlighted above, Dr. Madden’s 
affidavit relies on her “consulting experience with a wide range 
of employers over forty years.”86 That experience corroborates 
that “gender and racial pay gaps between otherwise equivalent 
workers largely arise from gender and racial differences in the 
salary set at hire.”87  
 
2. Declarations Filed by Chamber Members 
 
Members of the Chamber filed declarations in support of their 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  Those declarations 
asserted that a wage history ban would harm businesses 
because they use wage history as a factor in making salary 
offers and for other purposes.88 For example, Chamber 
Member Bittenbender stated that “[w]age history information 
is essential to salary offers in positions where [it] is unaware of 
the market wage.”89 Similarly, Comcast asserted it “frequently 
inquires” about an applicant’s “previous compensation and 
wage history,” among other things, to “understand the level of 
responsibility the applicant had,” evaluate the value the prior 
employer placed on the candidate, and “determine market 
wage for similar positions.”90 Similarly, the Children’s 
Hospital of Philadelphia submitted that it “relies on wage 
history in making a salary offer.”91 The Chamber and its 
members, however, presented no evidence that refuted or 
challenged the testimony before the City before passing the 
Ordinance.  That evidence showed that prior wages of women 
and minorities is more indicative of compounded 
discrimination than an accurate assessment of the individual’s 
value to their prior employer.  Thus, information obtained to 
 
85 Id. at 50.  
86 JA300. 
87 Id. 
88 See JA126–247.  
89 JA130. 
90 JA137–38. 
91 JA147. 
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assess the applicant’s market value only perpetuates wage 
disparity.  
 
D. The District Court Opinion 
As we noted at the outset, the district court granted the 
Chamber’s motion for a preliminary injunction as to the 
Inquiry Provision.  The court held that it likely violated the 
Chamber’s and its members’ free speech rights.  However, it 
found that the Reliance Provision–which prohibits relying on 
an applicant’s wage history at any point in the process–
regulated conduct rather than speech.  Accordingly, the court 
refused to enjoin that provision.92 
 
The court reasoned that the Reliance Provision, is “not subject 
. . . to First Amendment scrutiny” because the provision “does 
not ‘on its face, implicate the spoken or written word.’”93 
Instead, “[t]o the extent the Reliance Provision is content- or 
speaker-based,” the court found the Reliance Provision 
“targets conduct and not speech.”94 Because the Chamber did 
not meet its burden of showing that the provision implicates 
speech, no First Amendment analysis was required.95 
 
However, the court found that the Inquiry Provision did 
implicate speech and that it could not survive even the less 
stringent intermediate scrutiny required under the First 
Amendment.96 Thus the court did not discuss the actual level 
of scrutiny required to withstand the Chamber’s First 
Amendment challenge.97 Rather, the court held that the 
Ordinance was unconstitutional under the less stringent 
 
92 See Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 779.  
93 Id. at 801, 803. 
94 Id. at 803–04. 
95 Id. at 804. 
96 Id. at 785. 
97 Id. (“[B]ecause I conclude infra that the Inquiry Provision 
does not pass muster under the Central Hudson framework, I 
need not determine whether the Central Hudson test has been 
broadened for content- or speaker-based restrictions. I will 
thus apply Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny to the 
Inquiry Provision.”). 
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standard of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of New York.98 That decision rested on the 
court’s belief that the City had not presented substantial 
evidence to support a conclusion that the Inquiry Provision 
would help close the wage gap.99  
 
The district court determined that the requirements for a 
preliminary injunction were met with respect to the Inquiry 
Provision because “the Chamber ha[d] alleged a real and actual 
deprivation of its and its members' First Amendment rights 
through declarations.”100 Accordingly, it found, “the City 
cannot claim a legitimate interest in enforcing an 
unconstitutional law” because “there is a significant public 
interest in upholding First Amendment principles.”101 
 
This appeal and cross appeal followed. The Chamber argues 
that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin the Reliance 
Provision and that both provisions should have been reviewed 
under strict scrutiny. The City alleges the district court erred in 
enjoining the Inquiry Provision. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy, which 
should be granted only in limited circumstances.”102 As the 
 
98 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
99 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 800 (“I 
conclude that there is insufficient evidence to establish the 
alleged harm of discriminatory wages being perpetuated in 
subsequent wages such that they contribute to a 
discriminatory wage gap.”). 
100 Id. at 807 (citing e.g., Wonderling Decl. ¶¶ 16, 22 (“If the 
Ordinance is allowed to stand, it will harm the Chamber’s 
members named in the First Amended Complaint as well as 
other members within the Chamber’s broader membership by 
preventing them from making wage-history inquiries that they 
otherwise normally would make.”)).   
101 Id. 807–08. 
102 Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 
797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). 
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district court explained, the moving party must establish four 
factors to get a preliminary injunction:  
 
(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on 
the merits at final hearing; (2) the extent to which 
the plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by the 
conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which 
the defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the 
preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) [that] 
the public interest [weighs in favor of granting 
the injunction].103  
 
Generally, the moving party must establish the first two factors 
and only if these “gateway factors” are established does the 
district court consider the remaining two factors.104 The court 
then determines “in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken 
together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary 
relief.”105 
 
In First Amendment cases the initial burden is flipped. The 
government bears the burden of proving that the law is 
constitutional; thus, the plaintiff “must be deemed likely to 
prevail” if the government fails to show the constitutionality of 
the law.106 This is because “‘the burdens at the preliminary 
injunction stage track the burdens at trial,’” and the burden of 
proving the constitutionality of a law rests with the 
government.107  
 
 
103 A.T.&T. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 
F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Merch. & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 
F.2d 628, 632–33 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
104 Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 
2017), as amended (June 26, 2017). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 180 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 
(2004)). 
107 Id. (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006)). 
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Therefore, in First Amendment cases, the moving party must 
first “mak[e] a colorable claim” that the law restricts some 
form of speech.108 The government must then “justify its 
restriction on speech under whatever level of scrutiny is 
appropriate (intermediate or strict) given the restriction in 
question.”109 If the government succeeds in showing 
constitutionality, “then the motion for a preliminary injunction 
fails because there is no likelihood of success on the merits.”110 
If the government cannot establish that the law is 
constitutional, the challenger must still demonstrate irreparable 
harm, though that is generally presumed where the moving 
party’s freedom of speech right is being infringed.111  
 
We review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for 
“an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a clear mistake in 
the consideration of proof.”112 We review de novo the lower 
court’s conclusions of law but review its findings of fact for 
clear error.113  
 
A. The Reliance Provision 
 
1. The District Court Correctly Concluded that 
an Injunction as to the Reliance Provision 
Fails Because the Provision Does Not 
Implicate Speech 
 
As explained above, the Reliance Provision makes it illegal for 
employers to “rely on the wage history of a prospective 
employee from any current or former employer of the 
individual in determining the wages for such individual at any 
stage in the employment process, including the negotiation or 
 
108 Id. at 180 n.5 (quoting Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 
645 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 
F.3d 518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Kos Pharm., Inc. v. 
Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)). 
113 Id. 
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drafting of any employment contract.”114 The district court 
correctly concluded that this provision does not regulate 
speech. Accordingly, the court did not need to conduct a First 
Amendment analysis. As the court explained, the Reliance 
Provision does not “on its face, implicate the spoken or written 
word.”115 In arguing to the contrary, the Chamber claimed that 
the “Provision restricts [the] ability to communicate and/or 
convey a message.”116 The court found that here, unlike the 
situation in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida117 and 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,118 the conduct that the 
Reliance Provision regulates “is not executed through 
speech.”119  
 
In Wollschlaeger, certain provisions of the Florida Firearms 
Owners’ Privacy Act (FOPA), prohibited medical 
professionals from, among other things, entering information 
about a patient’s gun ownership into medical records, or 
inquiring about gun ownership, and discriminating against a 
gun owner, unless the action was relevant to the patient’s care. 
In explaining why the case was not helpful, the district court 
correctly distinguished the “more specific actions” of “physical 
entry. . . into a patient log, making a written inquiry[] [and] 
asking a question” which “implicate[] speech on their face” 
from prohibiting reliance in the Ordinance.120 The district court 
also explained that not all of the provisions in Wollschlaeger 
were subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Like the Reliance 
Provision here, the Wollschlaeger court had concluded that the 
anti-discrimination provision of the FOPA did not “on its face, 
implicate the spoken or written word,” and therefore scrutiny 
under the First Amendment was not appropriate.121  
 
 
114 Phila. Code. § 9-1131. 
115 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 803. 
116 Id. 
117 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). 
118 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
119 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 803–04.  
120 Id. at 803–04. 
121 Id. at 803. 
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The statute at issue in Humanitarian Law Project banned 
providing “material support” to terrorist organizations.122 The 
Supreme Court found that the statute did implicate speech 
because it prohibited legal training and advice, which was 
support given “in the form of speech.”123 In rejecting the 
Chamber’s challenge to the Reliance Provision, the district 
court correctly concluded that “[h]ere, unlike 
in [Humanitarian Law Project], the conduct is not executed 
through speech. Reliance on wage history does not demand 
speech the way that providing legal advice necessarily 
does.”124  
 
2. None of the Chamber’s Arguments Call into 
Question the District Court’s Conclusion  
 
The Chamber does not present any arguments before us that 
seriously challenge the district court’s reasoning or analysis of 
the Reliance Provision.  The district court’s discussion of that 
provision is thorough, accurate, and persuasive. As the district 
court explained, the Reliance Provision does not restrain any 
expressive message.  
 
The Chamber argues that in “formulating a proposed salary,” a 
prospective employer is “communicating a message about how 
much that applicant’s labor is worth to the employer.”125 But 
the Reliance Provision does not restrict an employer from 
communicating an applicant’s worth. An employer may still 
discuss an applicant’s value based on his or her qualifications 
and abilities. The Ordinance simply attempts to prevent the 
employer from unknowingly incorporating past wage 
discrimination into the terms of an applicant’s job offer. The 
employer remains free to communicate its own valuation of the 
employee by making as many offers at whatever salary it 
 
122 561 U.S. at 28. 
123 Id. 
124 Chamber, 319 F. Supp. 3d. at 804 (The “provisions [at 
issue] prohibited significantly more specific actions that 
implicated speech on their face[,] to the extent the Reliance 
Provision is content- or speaker-based, it targets conduct and 
not speech.”). 
125 Chamber Br. at 29. 
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deems appropriate.  The Ordinance merely attempts to ensure 
that any such offers are not unwittingly tethered to past 
discriminatory wage discrepancies.  
 
The Chamber also argues that because the Reliance Provision 
is “triggered” during the negotiation of a contract, it 
necessarily implicates speech.126 Consequently, the Chamber 
cites Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting,127 and Centro de la 
Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster 
Bay,128 for the well settled proposition that negotiating the 
terms of an employment arrangement–either orally or in 
writing–is speech subject to the protections of the First 
Amendment.  
 
This argument relies upon a misreading of the Ordinance. The 
Reliance Provision is triggered not during negotiation but by 
the employer’s reliance on the employee’s wage history “at any 
stage in the employment drafting process.”129 The Chamber 
focuses on the phrase, “including the negotiating or drafting of 
the employment contract,” but that is merely one of the many 
“stage[s] of the employment process” during which the 
provision applies. It is not, as the Chamber argues, the conduct 
that makes the provision applicable.  
 
Moreover, even if the Chamber is correct that the Reliance 
Provision is “triggered” by negotiation,  “it has never been 
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make 
a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in 
part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, 
 
126 Chamber Br. at 29 (“[T]he conduct triggering coverage 
under the statute consists of communicating a message.”). 
127 709 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 2013). 
128 868 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2017). 
129 Phila Code § 9-1131. “To rely on the wage history of a 
prospective employee from any current or former employer of 
the individual in determining the wages for such individual at 
any stage in the employment process, including the 
negotiation or drafting of any employment contract, unless 
such applicant knowingly and willingly disclosed his or her 
wage history to the employer, employment agency, employee 
or agent thereof.” Id.  
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either spoken, written, or printed.”130 As explained by the 
Supreme Court in National Institute of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra,131 regulations that have an incidental 
impact on speech are not unconstitutional violations of the 
freedom of speech. The district court recognized that, to the 
extent that the Reliance Provision has an arguable effect on 
speech, it is incidental to the targeted reliance and does not 
place the provision under First Amendment scrutiny.  
 
Moreover, Valle Del Sol and Centro de la Comunidad Hispana 
de Locust Valley both dealt with ordinances that regulated day 
laborers’ abilities to advertise their availability for work.132 
Advertising is prototypical speech that depends on spoken or 
written communication. Here, by contrast, the only activity 
being regulated by the Reliance Provision is the act of relying 
on wage history to set a salary. Under the Ordinance, the 
speech component of the negotiation process, i.e., the 
communication of a wage offer and any resulting discussion, 
is left intact. Other courts have reached similar results in 
analogous contexts.133 
 
Accordingly, as the Chamber has not shown a likelihood of 
success on the merits of its constitutional challenge to this part 
of the Ordinance; the district court correctly refused to enjoin 
enforcement of the Reliance Provision.  
 
 
130 Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 
1144, 1151 (2017) (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & 
Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)). During oral 
argument, the City Solicitor for the City of Philadelphia 
offered a very good analogy: An anti-discrimination 
Ordinance that prohibits hiring discrimination based on race 
does not implicate speech even though it may cause an 
establishment to remove a “Colored Applicants Only” sign.  
131 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
132 709 F.3d at 832; 868 F.3d at 113. 
133 See, e.g., International Franchise Association, Inc. v. City 
of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 408 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that 
the minimum wage law at issue there was an “economic 
regulation that does not target speech or expressive conduct”). 
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B. The Inquiry Provision  
As discussed above, the Inquiry Provision of the Ordinance 
prohibits “ask[ing] a job applicant in writing or otherwise . . . 
about [the applicant’s] wage history, requir[ing] disclosure of 
wage history, or condition[ing] employment or consideration 
for an interview or employment on disclosure of wage 
history[.]”134 Unlike the Reliance Provision, the Inquiry 
Provision clearly regulates speech because it prevents 
employers from asking potential applicants specific questions. 
The district court was therefore correct in concluding that it 
was first necessary to determine the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to apply to that provision.   
 
1. The Legal Standard 
 
The City argues that the speech at issue is commercial speech 
and therefore intermediate scrutiny under the test outlined in 
Central Hudson is appropriate. The Chamber argues that even 
if the speech at issue is commercial speech, we should apply 
strict scrutiny because the Inquiry Provision restricts 
expression based on content and speaker. We agree with the 
district court that the Inquiry Provision regulates commercial 
speech and that intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson is 
the appropriate level of review.  
 
a. Commercial Speech 
 
The Supreme Court has described commercial speech as 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the 
speaker and its audience.”135 A “proposal of possible 
employment . . . [is a] classic example[] of commercial 
speech.”136 Additionally, courts have recognized commercial 
 
134 Phila. Code. § 9-1131. 
135 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.  
136 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (“Each is no more than a 
proposal of possible employment. The advertisements are 
thus classic examples of commercial speech.”); see also 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975) (finding the 
speech at issue “classic examples of commercial speech, for 
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speech in a range of employment-related contexts, including 
communications that advertise labor availability and terms of 
employment,137 as well as agreements “under which services 
will be exchanged for compensation.”138 
  
We have recognized three factors that aid the inquiry into 
whether speech is commercial: “(1) is the speech an 
advertisement; (2) does the speech refer to a specific product 
or service; and (3) does the speaker have an economic 
motivation for the speech[?] . . . An affirmative answer to all 
three questions provides ‘strong support’ for the conclusion 
that the speech is commercial.”139 However, all three 
characteristics need not be present for a given expression to 
qualify as commercial speech.140 
Expression pertaining to a possible offer of employment 
involves (1) an advertisement by the prospective employee to 
the employer; (2) the focus of the employee’s services for hire; 
and (3) by definition, an economic motive. The district court 
appreciated that the Inquiry Provision pertains only to 
communications between an employer and prospective 
employee and implicates no interests beyond the contract of 
employment. Because the speech occurs in the context of 
employment negotiations, the economic motive is clear. The 
regulated speech is part of a “proposal of possible 
employment.” Thus, the district court correctly concluded: 
 
[T]he Inquiry Provision prohibits Philadelphia-
based employers from asking potential hires 
about their previous wage history. This inquiry 
occurs in the context of a job application or job 
interview, both of which propose a commercial 
 
each was no more than a proposal of possible employment”) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
137 Valle Del Sol Inc, 709 F.3d at 818–19. 
138 Nomi v. Regents for Univ. of Minn., 796 F. Supp. 412, 417 
(D. Minn. 1992) vacated on other grounds, 5 F.3d 332 (8th 
Cir. 1993). 
139 U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 
F.2d 914, 933 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983)).  
140 Id. 
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transaction . . . [where] “all affected speech is 
either speech soliciting a commercial transaction 
or speech necessary to the consummation of a 
commercial transaction.”141 
 
b. Intermediate Scrutiny under Central 
Hudson Is Appropriate 
 
 “The Central Hudson analysis is commonly referred to 
as ‘intermediate scrutiny.’”142 Because commercial speech is 
“linked inextricably with the commercial arrangement it 
proposes, . . . the State’s interest in regulating the underlying 
transaction may give it a concomitant interest in the expression 
itself.”143 “The Constitution therefore accords a lesser 
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally 
guaranteed expression.”144 
 
In Central Hudson, the Public Service Commission of New 
York City had attempted to address a fuel shortage in New 
York by promulgating an ordinance banning electricity-supply 
utilities from placing advertisements that promoted the use of 
electricity.145 A utility company challenged the ordinance 
arguing that it infringed on the company’s free speech rights 
because the ordinance banned speech based on the specific 
content of the speech and the identity of the speaker. In 
resolving the First Amendment issue, the Supreme Court 
“articulated a test for determining whether a particular 
commercial speech regulation is constitutionally 
permissible[.]”146 Courts must determine whether: (1) the 
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) the regulation 
 
141 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 783 (citing 
Valle Del Sol, 709 F.3d at 818). 
142 Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 844 
(9th Cir. 2017) (citing Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 623). 
143 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 784 (citing 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)). 
144 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 552–53.   
145 Id. at 559. 
146 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 
(2002). 
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directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and 
(4) “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest.”147 As elaborated on below, under this test, the 
“fit” between the proposed restriction and the government’s 
interest need not be the least restrictive means. It need only be 
a “reasonable fit between the legislature’s ends and the means 
chosen to accomplish those ends.”148  
 
c. Strict Scrutiny Is Inappropriate Here 
 
The Chamber argues that because the Ordinance only applies 
to employers and is focused squarely on content (wage 
history), strict scrutiny should have been applied.149 But as we 
described above, the Supreme Court has consistently applied 
intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech restrictions, even 
those that were content- and speaker-based, particularly when 
the challenged speech involves an offer of employment.150  
 
We realize, of course, that it may be appropriate to apply strict 
scrutiny to a restriction on commercial speech that is 
viewpoint-based.151 If the regulation has the practical effect of 
 
147 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
148 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 528 (2001). 
149 Chamber Br. at 24. The Ordinance’s speech restrictions, 
the Chamber argues, are content-based due to their 
“appli[cation] to particular speech because of the topic 
discussed—namely, wage history.” Id.  
150 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176, 183–84 (1999) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to prohibition on broadcast advertising 
of legal casino gambling); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 
U.S. 476, 478, 482, 488 (1995) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to law prohibiting display of alcohol content on beer 
labels); Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 620, 635 (1995) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to prohibition on attorneys sending 
written solicitations to prospective clients relating to an 
accident or disaster). 
151 See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C. (“Turner 
I”), 512 U.S. 622, 658 (“Congress may not abridge the rights 
of some persons to engage in political expression in order to 
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promoting some messages or some speakers based on the 
content of the speech or the identity of the speaker, something 
more than intermediate scrutiny may be necessary to survive a 
First Amendment inquiry. “[S]peaker-based laws demand 
strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government’s preference 
for the substance of what the favored speakers have to say (or 
aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to say).”152  
 
The Supreme Court addressed this in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
Minnesota.153   It explained that the rule that content-based 
speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny is “not 
absolute” and is inapplicable when the restriction does not 
“‘raise[] the specter that the Government may effectively drive 
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’”154  
 
Here, the Inquiry Provision precludes all employers from 
inquiring into wage history, without focusing on any particular 
viewpoint or favoring any particular employer or job. It also 
applies to all employees without regard to the employee’s prior 
salary or job title. It does limit the prospective employer’s 
speech, but only because that limitation prevents the tentacles 
of any past wage discrimination from attaching to an 
employee’s subsequent salary. This simply does not implicate 
the kind of viewpoint or speaker discrimination that the 
Chamber relies on in its attempt to distinguish Central Hudson 
and have us apply strict scrutiny.  
 
The Chamber points to Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc,155 in support 
but Sorrell is unhelpful because the restriction there was 
viewpoint-based and “heightened scrutiny” was therefore 
necessary. In Sorrell, Vermont had passed a law restricting the 
sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that revealed the 
prescribing practices of individual doctors.156 However, the 
 
enhance the relative voice of other segments of our society.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
152 Id. 
153 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
154 Id. at 387–88 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members 
of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991)). 
155 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
156 Id. at 557. 
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law contained exceptions that, for example, allowed entities 
engaging in “educational communications” to purchase the 
information, but barred disclosure when the recipients would 
use the information for marketing.157 Additionally, “Vermont 
could supply academic organizations with prescriber-
identifying information to use in countering the messages of 
brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and in promoting 
the prescription of generic drugs,” but the law prevented 
pharmaceutical manufacturers from using the information for 
their own marketing purposes.158 Thus, the statute 
“disfavor[ed] marketing, i.e., speech with a particular content, 
as well as particular speakers, i.e., entities engaged in 
marketing on behalf of pharmaceutical manufacturers.”159 
Strict scrutiny was therefore required.  
 
Moreover, even though the statute there was neither viewpoint 
neutral nor speaker neutral, it is not even clear that the Court 
applied strict scrutiny there. As the district court astutely 
recognized here, Sorrell merely stands for the proposition that 
some level of scrutiny above rational basis review applied. The 
district court explained: “Sorrell references a ‘heightened 
scrutiny,’ but it is just as likely that this is the same as 
intermediate scrutiny, which is stricter than rational basis 
scrutiny.”160 Moreover, after Sorrell, courts have continued to 
apply Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny to commercial 
speech restrictions and rejected the notion that Sorrell requires 
strict scrutiny in these cases just as the district court 
explained.161 That said, we need not resolve that issue here 
 
157 Id. at 564. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 552. 
160 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 784; see also 
Prieto, 861 F.3d at 847 (“There is nothing novel in Sorrell’s 
use of the term ‘heightened scrutiny’ to distinguish from 
rational basis review.”). 
161 See, e.g., Prieto, 861 F.3d at 848–49 (rejecting notion that 
Sorrell’s reference to ‘heightened” scrutiny was intended to 
apply a standard to commercial speech cases that is greater 
than intermediate scrutiny); 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., 
LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 2014) (“The 
upshot is that when a court determines commercial speech 
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because it is clear that the restrictions in the Ordinance are 
viewpoint neutral and do not merit strict scrutiny. Accordingly, 
we agree with the district court’s decision to subject the 
Ordinance only to intermediate scrutiny under Central 
Hudson. 
2. The Inquiry Provision Satisfies Central 
Hudson Intermediate Scrutiny  
 
Under Central Hudson, speech “at least must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading[]” to qualify for protection.162 If 
the speech concerns illegal activity or is misleading, then it is 
not subject to First Amendment protection at all and our 
inquiry ends.163 If the subject is not unlawful and the message 
not misleading, we must then determine whether the 
government has a substantial interest in the restriction. If it 
does, the challenged restriction must directly advance that 
interest.164 If it does directly advance the interest, the final 
prong of the Central Hudson inquiry requires us to decide if 
the restriction is nevertheless more extensive than necessary to 
serve the government’s substantial interest.165 The last two 
elements of the analysis are related because they “basically 
involve a consideration of the ‘fit’ between the legislature’s 
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.”166 
Determining whether the restriction is more extensive than 
 
restrictions are content- or speaker-based, it should then 
assess their constitutionality under Central Hudson.”). 
162 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Posadas e Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto 
Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986). 
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necessary, is not to be confused with the “least restrictive 
alternative” inquiry required to survive strict scrutiny.167  
 
a. The Speech at Issue Is Not “Related to 
Illegal Activity” 
 
The City has argued that inquiring about wage history is 
“related to illegal activity” because the Inquiry Provision 
prohibits acquiring information that cannot be legally used 
because of the restrictions in the Reliance Provision. In 
rejecting that argument, the district court explained that not all 
uses of wage history are illegal: “For example, acquisition of 
wage history is allowed in other contexts such as for gathering 
market information;” and, “the existence of a wage history is 
not in and of itself illegal.”168 The district court correctly 
concluded: “[s]imply because wage history could be relied 
upon in fashioning a salary in violation of the Reliance 
Provision does not render all other legal activity related to 
wage history illegal.”169 Accordingly, the Court held that the 
 
167 See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 556 (“[I]t [is] clear that 
‘the least restrictive means’ is not the standard; instead, the 
case law requires a reasonable ‘fit between the legislature’s 
ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, . . . a 
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective’”). 
Under strict scrutiny the government faces a more difficult 
burden, it “must show that the ‘regulation is necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest,’” Burson v. Freeman, 504 
U.S. 191, 198 (1992), and the regulation must be the least 
restrictive means of achieving the interest. McCullen v. 
Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014). 
168 Chamber, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 786. 
169 Id. (emphasis added); see also Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 
718 F.2d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (“The 
commercial speech doctrine would disappear if its protection 
ceased whenever the advertised product might be used 
illegally.”). 
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language the provision targets does not “concern unlawful 
activity.”170 We agree.  
 
The City relies in part upon Pittsburgh Press v. Human 
Relations Commission,171  in arguing that speech can be 
“related to unlawful activity” if only some of its uses are 
prohibited. In Pittsburgh Press, one of the provisions in a 
Pittsburgh Ordinance prohibited discrimination in employment 
and another prohibited “any notice or advertisement relating to 
‘employment’ or membership which indicates any 
discrimination because of . . . sex.”172 The Pittsburgh 
Commission on Human Relations was in charge of 
implementing the Ordinance. The Commission concluded that 
Pittsburgh Press had violated the Ordinance through its 
practice of placing “help-wanted” advertisements in sex-
specific columns (i.e., “Male Help Wanted,” “Female Help 
Wanted”). The final Commission Order, however, did not 
prohibit all sex-specific advertisements; it exempted certain 
jobs such as: “employment in domestic service,” and “jobs for 
which the Commission ha[d] certified a bona fide occupational 
exception,” and allowed exempted entities to advertise in a 
sex-specific manner.173 Pittsburgh Press sued, arguing that the 
Commission’s Order violated the First Amendment by 
restricting its editorial choices.  
 
The Supreme Court agreed, concluding that “[t]he 
advertisements, as embroidered by their placement, 
signaled that the advertisers were likely to show an illegal sex 
preference in their hiring decisions.”174 Accordingly, the Court 
 
170 Chamber, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 787. Under the district 
court’s reasoning, on the other hand, a law that prohibited the 
advertising of the sale of cocaine, for example, would present 
a speech restriction that always and only related to illegal 
activity because there are no other legal uses/purposes behind 
the sale of cocaine. 
171 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
172 Id. at 378. The Ordinance also prohibited “aid[ing] . . . in 
the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment 
practice under the Ordinance.” 
173 Id. at 380. 
174 Id. at 389. 
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found that “any First Amendment interest [that] might be 
served by [the advertisements] . . . [wa]s altogether absent 
when the commercial activity itself [wa]s illegal.”175  
 
The City argues Pittsburgh Press is analogous because even 
though there were legal uses for sex-specific advertisements—
i.e., the specific exemptions recognized by the Commission—
the Court still concluded that sex-specific advertising was 
related to illegal activity and was therefore not protected by the 
First Amendment. Similarly, here, the City would have us 
decide that even though every inquiry into a prospective 
applicant’s wage history would not necessarily lead to a 
violation of law, reliance on that history would be illegal. Thus, 
the City urges us to hold that the Ordinance “concerns unlawful 
activity.”   
 
We, however, agree with the district court’s conclusion that 
commercial speech should not lose the protection of the First 
Amendment simply because a legislature has prohibited one of 
many uses of the regulated speech.176 As the district court 
reasoned, and as the Chamber argues, if the City’s position is 
upheld, a city could perform an easy end-run around First 
Amendment scrutiny by passing a speech restriction in 
conjunction with a law that made one use of the regulated 
speech illegal. The result would be that the prohibited speech 
would always “relate to unlawful activity” and therefore fail 
the first prong of the Central Hudson analysis. 
 
b. The City has a Substantial Interest in 
Closing the Wage Gap 
 
The Chamber does not dispute the district court’s conclusion 
that remedying wage discrimination and promoting wage 
equity is a substantial government interest, and we agree. 
Accordingly, we need not discuss the second prong of the 
Central Hudson inquiry. 
 
 
 
175 Id. 
176 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 787. 
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c. The Inquiry Provision Directly Advances 
the City’s Interest in Pay Equity 
 
The third prong of Central Hudson requires us to determine 
whether the Inquiry Provision directly “advances the 
Government’s interest in a direct and material way.”177 To 
survive that inquiry, the City must show that the “the harms it 
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate each 
of them to a material degree.”178 “[S]peculation or conjecture” 
cannot satisfy this burden.179 A court’s inquiry under this prong 
“is not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace 
[legislators’] factual predictions with our own.”180 Rather, a 
court’s task is merely to determine whether the legislature has 
“drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial 
evidence.”181 This is the heart of the current dispute. The 
district court did not believe that the City produced sufficient 
evidence to establish that the Inquiry Provision would advance 
its substantial interest in mitigating the racial and gender-based 
pay gap. The court’s skepticism is summed up in the following 
passage from its opinion: 
 
While the conclusion that a discriminatory wage 
gap could be affected by prohibiting wage 
history inquiries was characterized by respected 
professionals as a logical, common sense 
outcome, more is needed.  Like the Rubin case, 
the testimony in support of this theory is riddled 
with conclusory statements, amounting to 
“various tidbits” and “educated guesses.” 
Importantly, aside from Dr. Madden’s affidavit, 
the information relied upon by the City does not 
address the possibility that disparate wages 
could also be based on factors having nothing to 
 
177 Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 625 (internal citations omitted). 
178 Id.at 626. 
179 Id. 
180 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666. 
181 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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do with discrimination, such as qualifications, 
experience, or any number of other factors.182 
We disagree.   
It is clear to us that Dr. Madden’s affidavit would, by itself, 
satisfy the inquiry. However, that is not the point. Dr. 
Madden’s affidavit simply corroborated the testimony given to 
the City Council prior to it enacting the Ordinance with 
additional empirical evidence. The issue is the apparent failure 
by the district court to afford the testimony and studies 
presented to the City Council sufficient probative value given 
its equation of it with conclusory statements and educated 
guesses.   
 
The Supreme Court has “permitted litigants to justify speech 
restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to 
different locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict 
scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, 
consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’”183 And it has often 
done so on records far less compelling than the record 
supporting the Inquiry Provision of this Ordinance. The Court 
has explained that “the quantum of empirical evidence 
[required]. . . var[ies] up or down with the novelty and 
plausibility of the justification raised.”184 And, especially 
relevant here, it has recognized that “[a] municipality 
considering an innovative solution may not have data that 
could demonstrate the efficacy of its proposal because the 
 
182 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 797–98 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
183 Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 628 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 
504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)) (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion)) 
(emphases added). See also City Br. at 43–44 (citing Heffner 
v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 92 (3d Cir. 2014), WV Ass’n of Club 
Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 
303–04 (4th Cir. 2009), Coyote Pub., Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 
592, 608 (9th Cir. 2010) to show recent decisions reflecting 
the Supreme Court’s flexible approach to speech restrictions 
under intermediate scrutiny). 
184 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000). 
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solution would, by definition, not have been implemented 
previously.”185  
 
This record contains a plethora of evidence that (1) the wage 
gap is substantial and real (indeed, the parties concede this 
point); (2) numerous experiments have been conducted, which 
controlled for such variables as education, work experience, 
academic achievement, etc. and still found a wage gap; (3) 
researchers over many years have attributed the gap, in 
substantial part, to discrimination; (4) existing civil rights laws 
have been inadequate to close the wage gap; and, critically, (5) 
witnesses who reviewed the data concluded that relying on 
wage history can perpetuate gender and race discrimination. 
Based on that substantial evidence, the City Council made a 
reasonable judgment that a wage history ban would further the 
City’s goal of closing the gap and ameliorating the 
discrimination inherent in the disparate wages. 
  
The district court believed that the evidence before the City 
didn’t account for variables other than gender and race. 
However, Barbara Price presented the Council with evidence 
to the contrary, and the studies of Blau and Khan summarized 
in the Madden affidavit isolated out the variables of gender and 
race, thereby ensuring they did not affect the results.186  This 
evidence showed that even after accounting for such variables 
as choice of occupation, hours worked, economic sector, 
experience, GPA, undergraduate institution, and marital status, 
there is a significant gap between the earnings of men and 
women beginning one year after graduation and widening in 
the years thereafter.187 
The City merely “dr[ew] reasonable inferences based on 
substantial evidence[]’”188 that the Inquiry Provision would 
address the wage gap, and the district court erred when it 
“reweigh[ed] the evidence” and “replace[d] [the City’s] factual 
predictions with [its] own.”189 
 
185 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 
439–40 (2002).   
186 Blau and Khan at 32; see also fn. 60, 75, supra. 
187 See JA275. 
188 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 181 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
189 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666. 
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i. Caselaw Considering Whether a 
Legislature Relied on 
Substantial Evidence to Support 
a Speech Restriction Under 
Central Hudson Demonstrates 
that the City Presented 
Sufficient Evidence to Support 
the Ordinance.  
 
Our review of caselaw examining whether a legislature had 
sufficient evidence to support a challenged legislative 
enactment demonstrates that the Inquiry Provision is 
constitutional. In Burson v. Freeman,190 Central Hudson itself, 
and Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. 
Brentwood Academy,191 the Supreme Court upheld laws 
restricting commercial speech even though they were 
supported by much less evidence than the City produced to 
demonstrate the need for the Inquiry Provision.  
 
In Burson, the Court considered whether a 100-foot bubble 
zone that prohibited political speech outside of polling places 
was constitutional.192 The Tennessee statute at issue implicated 
three fundamental First Amendment concerns because it 
regulated political speech, speech in a public forum, and the 
content of speech.193 The Court subjected the ordinance to 
strict scrutiny but still upheld it.194  We realize that the Court 
in Burson relied upon a “modified ‘burden of proof’” because 
the First Amendment right at issue there “threaten[ed] to 
interfere with the act of voting itself.”195 Nevertheless, the 
analysis in Burson provides helpful guidance in determining 
whether the City’s evidence was sufficient to survive the third 
prong of the Central Hudson inquiry.  
 
 
190 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
191 551 U.S. 291 (2007).   
192 Burson, 504 U.S. at 211. 
193 Id. at 196. 
194 Id. at 197, 211. 
195 Id. at 208 n.11. 
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The Burson court explained that it “never has held a State to 
the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective effects” 
of a speech regulation.196 Accordingly, the Court relied on 
history, common sense, and one witness, noting that it would 
be “difficult for the states to put on witnesses who [could] 
testify as to . . . the exact effect” of the proposed law.197 In fact, 
rather than demand strict empirical evidence that the 
challenged restriction on speech advanced the underlying 
governmental interest, the Court’s analysis rested on the 
presumed logic of a 100-foot barrier around a polling place for 
the purpose of allowing voters fifteen seconds of uninterrupted 
contemplation before casting their ballots.198 There was no 
empirical evidence that voters needed fifteen seconds of 
uninterrupted contemplation to cast an informed ballot, nor 
was there any evidence that voters would use the fifteen 
seconds it took to traverse the 100-foot buffer zone for 
contemplation, as opposed to conversation, daydreaming, or 
reading a newspaper. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee Secondary, is also 
informative. There, the Court accepted commonsense 
conclusions in the absence of empirical data in considering 
whether the enforcement of a rule governing interscholastic 
sports violated the First Amendment.199 The rule under review 
prohibited high school coaches from using “undue influence” 
when recruiting middle school students for athletic 
programs.200 Much like the record here, the evidence before the 
Court consisted of testimonial and documentary evidence, 
including letters sent by a school football coach to a group of 
unenrolled eighth-grade boys inviting them to participate in 
spring practice sessions.201 In upholding the sanction imposed 
on the coach’s speech, the Court noted that it “need[ed] no 
empirical data to credit [the agency’s] commonsense 
conclusion” that the speech at issue—an inquiry by a would-
 
196 Id. at 208 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 
U.S. 189, 195 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted). 
197 Id. at 208-211. 
198 Id.  
199 551 U.S. at 294. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 294-95. 
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be authority figure of a prospective team member—could exert 
the type of undue influence prohibited by the rule.202  
 
Finally, in Central Hudson, the Court held that a prohibition 
on advertising by utilities was supported by substantial 
evidence.203 Rather than require strict empirical proof, the 
Court relied on the commonsense conclusion that “[t]here is an 
immediate connection between advertising and demand for 
electricity.”204  
 
As we have summarized, the City did offer substantial 
evidence in the form of testimony and metanalysis of relevant 
research to support the need for the Inquiry Provision. 
Reasonable minds can debate whether the City’s evidence 
placed the need for, and potential effectiveness of, the Inquiry 
Provision beyond doubt. However, given the discussion in 
Burson, Tennessee Secondary, and Central Hudson, certainty 
of proof or empirical data is not required here. Rather, 
substantial evidence of the possibility that the speech 
restriction could favorably impact a concern that the state actor 
had a fundamental interest in addressing is sufficient. The City 
easily satisfied that standard.   In concluding otherwise, the 
district court imposed too high a burden on the City.  
 
As noted earlier, all parties agree that there is a longstanding 
disparity in the pay of women and minorities compared to 
wages of White males. The district court readily accepted the 
existence of this pay gap.205 Moreover, the Chambers’ CEO 
 
202 Id. at 300. 
203 447 U.S. at 568. 
204 Id., 447 U.S. at 569. Although the Court eventually found, 
under the fourth prong, that the law at issue was overbroad 
because it “suppresse[d] speech that in no way impairs the 
State’s interest in energy conservation,” id. at 570, under the 
third prong, the Court simply recognized the “immediate 
connection” that limiting advertising would have on demand 
for electricity. Id. at 569. 
205Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 792 
(“[P]ractically all of the . . . testimony amplifies a point that 
really is not in dispute – that there is a gender pay disparity.”) 
Although this excerpt from the district court opinion refers 
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stated that Chamber members relied on wage history “to have 
a better understanding of whether a candidate is worth pursuing 
based on previous compensation levels.”206 Nevertheless, the 
district court relied primarily on four cases in concluding that 
the City failed to meet its burden:207 Edenfield v. Fane,208 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,209 Pitt News v. Pappert 210 and 
Wollschlaeger.  However, the City’s proof here is much more 
robust than the records before those courts.  
 
In Edenfield and Rubin the restrictions on commercial speech 
were facially based on unsubstantiated fears supported by 
conclusory statements. In Edenfield, a Certified Public 
Accountant challenged a rule created by the Florida Board of 
Accountancy that prohibited CPAs from soliciting clients in-
person.211 The Florida Board believed that in-person 
solicitation would lead to unethical conduct by CPAs.212 In 
striking down the restriction on commercial speech, the Court 
reasoned that the only evidence presented in support of the 
Florida Board’s position came from an affidavit by one of its 
former chairmen.213 He stated the solicitation ban was 
 
specifically only to the gender disparity, it is clear that the 
court also accepted the existence of a racial disparity. The 
court’s concern was not with the existence of these 
disparities, but with whether the City had established a 
sufficient “fit” between the Inquiry Provision and these 
disparities to support its conclusions that the Inquiry 
Provision was necessary to address the disparities. 
206 JA124. 
207 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. at 794 (“Edenfield, 
Rubin, Pitt News, and Wollschlaeger instruct that some 
evidence is required for the legislature to conclude that the 
law at issue will directly advance the government’s 
substantial interest. Theories and unsupported opinions will 
not suffice to demonstrate that the asserted harms are real.”). 
208 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
209 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
210 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004). 
210 Id. at 107–08. 
211 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 764. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 764, 771-72. 
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necessary to “prevent overreaching and vexatious conduct by 
the CPA.”214 His conclusion in his affidavit depended on the 
unsubstantiated theory that a CPA who solicits clients would 
be beholden to the client and thus willing to bend the rules.215 
Consequently, the Court refused to credit his affidavit.216   
 
In Rubin, the Federal Alcohol Administration Act prohibited 
beer labels from displaying alcohol content for fear of a 
“strength war” among brewers.217 The justification for the law 
was the purported “common-sense” conclusion that if the 
alcohol content were not advertised, customers would be less 
likely to buy the product based on the alcohol content.218 The 
Court found that the Act did not directly advance the stated 
purpose because the government’s regulatory scheme was 
“irrational.”219 Malt liquor, wine, and other alcohol sellers 
could and did label their bottles with the strength of the 
drink.220 The government, the Court noted, had relied on 
“anecdotal evidence and educated guesses” in contending that 
competition based on alcohol content was occurring and found 
that these “various tidbits” could not overcome the irrationality 
of the scheme.221 Thus, the very existence of a “strength war” 
was in doubt and no evidence was offered to establish that any 
such phenomena actually existed. Whereas, here, the wage gap 
that the Inquiry Provision seeks to address is a given, and the 
reasoned conclusions presented to the City Council were 
entitled to more credit than owed to the educated guesses 
before the Federal Alcohol Administration.  
 
The law we struck down in Pitt News, was similarly based 
solely upon “speculation and conjecture.” The law was 
premised on the assumption that prohibiting alcohol ads from 
appearing in university publications would “slacken the 
demand for alcohol by Pitt students” and help curb underage 
 
214 Id. at 765. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 775-76. 
217 514 U.S. at 478–79. 
218 Id. at 487 
219 Id. at 488. 
220 Id. at 486–89. 
221 Id. at 490. 
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drinking.222 We found that the legislature’s conclusion was 
“counterintuitive and unsupported by any evidence.”223 There 
was no evidence, for example, that the removal of the ads 
would make it harder to find places near campus to buy 
alcohol. Furthermore, not only were students able to see 
alcohol ads in many other publications and on television, more 
that 75% of the university population was of the legal drinking 
age.224  
 
Finally, Wollschlaeger is similarly unpersuasive because of the 
tenuous reasoning supporting the restriction on commercial 
speech. There, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
struck down a law that had been enacted based solely on a few 
anecdotes.225 Certain Florida laws prevented doctors from 
asking patients “whether they own firearms or have firearms in 
their homes, or from recording answers to such questions.”226 
The legislature asserted that the law was necessary to protect 
gun-owning Floridians from the “private encumbrances” on 
their Second Amendment Rights that allegedly came from 
being subject to such questions by physicians.227 The 
legislature had relied on “six anecdotes and nothing more” to 
justify enacting the restrictions.228 In striking down the 
legislation, the court observed that while anecdotes can provide 
evidence, there was “no other evidence, empirical or 
otherwise” presented by the legislature, and the six anecdotes 
could not show that the harms were “real, [and] not merely 
conjectural,” such that the regulations “will in fact alleviate 
[the] harms in a direct and material way.”229 Thus the 
Wollschlaeger court required something more than anecdotal 
evidence and less than empirical evidence if the restriction was 
to survive the third prong of the Central Hudson inquiry.  
 
 
222 379 F.3d at 107. 
223 Id. (emphasis added). 
224 Id. at 108. 
225 848 F.3d at 1319. 
226 Id. at 1303. 
227 Id. at 1312. 
228 Id. (emphasis added). 
229 Id. (quoting Turner II, 512 U.S. 622 at 664). 
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The City’s proof of the nexus between its substantial interest 
in eliminating the real phenomenon of a racial and gender-
based wage gap and the need for the limitations that are at the 
heart of the Inquiry Provision is in a different category than the 
cases we have just discussed. There is testimony here that the 
gender disparity in pay in Pennsylvania has existed for the past 
five decades despite the passage of laws over that period to 
remedy such discrimination.230 Terry Fromson explained how 
this wage gap is compounded through institutional 
discrimination and explained how other states have addressed 
this issue.231 Marianne Bellesorte researched the wage gap for 
women and men of color, and explained how the inequities 
began right out of college and continued to affect women, in 
particular, until retirement. Finally, Jovida Hill and Rue 
Landau provided empirical evidence that substantiated the 
distilled conclusions of Fromson and Bellesorte.232  This 
testimony is much more than “conclusory statements, . . . and 
‘educated guesses[.]’”233  Moreover, Dr. Madden’s affidavit 
amplified this testimony by viewing it through the empirical 
lens of thousands of studies she summarized.234  There is 
therefore ample evidence to establish the fit between the 
Inquiry Provision and the societal evil it was intended to 
address.  
 
Our conclusion that the district court imposed too high a 
burden on the City’s proof is consistent with the en banc 
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Rizo v. 
Yovino.235 There, the en banc court held that an employer’s 
reliance on the plaintiff’s prior salaries to justify paying a 
female less than her male cohort’s salary was a violation of the 
 
230 H’rg Tr. at 66. 
231 Id. at 75. 
232 Id. at 8-12. 
233 Chamber of Commerce, 319 F. Supp. At 798. 
234 JA297. 
235 887 F.3d 453, 460–61 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (holding 
that a female employee’s prior salary does not qualify as a 
“factor other than sex” under the federal Equal Pay Act that 
can justify paying her less than a male employee who 
performs substantially equal work), vacated on other grounds 
by Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019). 
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Equal Pay Act.236 The court’s explanation was straightforward. 
“The question before us is . . . simple: can an employer justify 
a wage differential between male and female employees by 
relying on prior salary? . . . [T]he answer is clear: No.”237 
There, the employer had argued that the plaintiff’s disparate 
salary was not barred by The Equal Pay Act because, in paying 
her a wage based on her prior salaries, the differential was 
based on a factor other than sex which is explicitly allowed 
under the Equal Pay Act.238 The court held that that 
consideration of salary history “allow[s] employers to 
capitalize on the persistence of the wage gap and perpetuate 
that gap ad infinitum.”239 Other courts have reached the same 
conclusion.240 
 
Notwithstanding our recitation of the impressive record that 
supports this Ordinance, we think it important to emphasize 
that neither scores of empirical studies nor proof to scientific 
certainty is necessary to carry the City’s burden here.  Even 
though we find the City’s evidence here more than sufficient 
to carry its burden under the third prong of Central Hudson, it 
is important not to lose sight of the fact that where a legislature 
presents an “innovative solution,” the Supreme Court has 
recognized that it “may not have data that could [conclusively] 
demonstrate the efficacy of its proposal because the solution 
would, by definition, not have been implemented 
 
236 Id. at 456 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). 
237 Id.  
238 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) allows “a differential based on 
any factor other than sex.” 
239 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 456–57 (emphasis added).  
240 See, e.g., Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(“if prior salary alone were a justification, the exception 
would swallow up the rule and inequality in pay among 
genders would be perpetuated”); Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 
F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015) (Equal Pay Act “precludes 
an employer from relying solely upon a prior salary to justify 
pay disparity”) (citation omitted); but see, e.g., Wernsing v. 
Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468-70 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that prior salary alone can justify wage disparities). 
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previously.”241 Nevertheless, the City did produce such 
evidence here and clearly carried its burden.  However, as we 
held in King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey,242 and as 
we recount in detail below, legislatures are not 
“constitutionally required to wait for conclusive scientific 
evidence before acting to protect [their] citizens from serious 
threats of harm.”243  
 
In Alameda Books, the City of Los Angeles enacted legislation 
that prohibited “more than one adult entertainment business” 
from inhabiting “the same building, structure or portion 
thereof.”244 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
invalidated this restriction on speech finding that “the city 
failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely 
to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use 
establishments [wa]s “designed to serve” the city’s substantial 
interest in reducing crime.”245 The Supreme Court disagreed.  
 
The Court concluded that the City had presented sufficient 
evidence upon which to base the speech restriction.  Justice 
O’Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas, explained that the respondents “ask[ed] the 
city to demonstrate, not merely by appeal to common sense, 
but also with empirical data, that its ordinance will successfully 
lower crime.”246 But they concluded that “[o]ur cases have 
never required that municipalities make such a showing, 
certainly not without actual and convincing evidence from 
plaintiffs to the contrary.”247 
 
241 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 
439–40 (2002). 
242 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds 
by Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. 
Ct. 2361 (2018). 
243 767 F.3d at 239.  
244 Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 429. 
245 Id. at 433. 
246 Id. at 439. 
247 Id. The court noted, “Respondents’ claim assumes that the 
. . . study proves that all adult businesses, whether or not they 
are located near other adult businesses, generate crime. This 
is a plausible reading of the results from the 1977 study, but 
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Here, as in Alameda Books, the Plaintiff has offered no proof 
to counter the City’s conclusion about the need for, or 
effectiveness of, the Inquiry Provision. In fact, as we have 
explained, some of the Plaintiff’s proof substantiates the City’s 
position.  A lack of contrary evidence lightens the legislature’s 
burden.248  
 
The substantial legislative record here is simply not analogous 
to the “irrational,” “conclusory,” “speculative,” and purely 
anecdotal evidence presented in Edenfield, Rubin, Pitt News 
and Wollschlaeger. Nonetheless, the Chamber argues, that 
even though “conclusive scientific evidence of the Ordinance’s 
effect is not required, ‘substantial evidence’ means ‘some 
concrete evidence is required.’”249 In support, the Chamber 
cites to “a 106-page summary of [a] 2-year study,”250 relied 
upon in Florida Bar and the “empirical judgments” of “a 
number of well-known, reputable professional and scientific 
organizations,” from our decision in King.251  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
respondents do not demonstrate that it is a compelled reading. 
Nor do they provide evidence that refutes the city’s 
interpretation of the study, under which the city’s prohibition 
should on balance reduce crime.” Id. at 438. Accordingly, the 
Court concluded that the City had supported the law with 
sufficient evidence. 
248 See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 
377, 394 (2000) (“[t]here might, of course, be need for a more 
extensive evidentiary documentation if respondents had made 
any showing of their own to cast doubt on the apparent 
implications of [the government’s] evidence and the record 
here”). 
249 Chamber Br. at 49. 
250 Id. 
251 767 F.3d at 238. 
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ii. The Evidence Here is Stronger 
Than the Evidence Supporting 
the Restrictions in Florida Bar 
and King 
 
The Chamber makes much of Florida Bar, and the district 
court cited it as demonstrative of the type of “extensive” record 
necessary to sustain a speech infringement.252 There, the 
Florida Bar Association enacted rules banning direct-mail 
solicitation of clients in the 30 days following an accident or 
disaster. Members of the Florida bar sued, claiming that the 
law infringed their right of commercial speech. In rejecting that 
challenge, the Court relied upon the Bar Association’s citation 
to a 106-page study purporting to show the harm that the Bar 
was attempting to mitigate.253 However, a closer look at the 
study reveals that it contained information that was less 
relevant, less methodologically sound, and much less 
informative than the evidence supporting the Inquiry Provision 
here.  
 
The Majority of the Court described the study as “contain[ing] 
. . . statistical and anecdotal [data] . . . supporting the Bar’s 
contentions” that the direct-mail solicitations in the wake of 
accidents “reflects poorly on the profession.”254 The Court 
accepted that evidence as sufficiently probative even though 
much of the data in the surveys did not address the specific 
issues the restriction was supposed to address. The Court 
pointed to a subset of the findings from the study: it cited one 
survey of Florida adults that “indicated . . . Floridians ‘have 
negative feelings about those attorneys who use direct mail 
advertising.’”255 It also provided a handful of statistics about 
Floridians’ views of lawyer advertising.256 However, only one 
question referred to the reputation of the legal community–the 
 
252 Chamber, 319 F. Supp. at 796, 800 (“Unlike in Florida 
Bar, there are no comprehensive studies demonstrating the 
alleged harm.”). 
253 Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 627. 
254 Id. at 626. 
255 Id. at 626-27. 
256 Id. 
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harm that the law was apparently aiming to remedy.257 It 
appeared from the responses to that question that direct mail 
solicitation in general, rather than solicitation in the 30 days 
following an accident, was what lowered the views of the legal 
profession (and did so in only one quarter of those 
surveyed).258 The primary evidence relied upon by the Court, 
did not squarely address the harm that the rule was enacted to 
remedy. 
 
Despite the fact that the study gave “few indications of the 
sample size or selection procedures employed” and even 
though “no copies of the actual surveys employed,” were 
presented to the Court, the Court held that the Bar adequately 
supported the law.259 In dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that the 
record: (1) contained no explanation of methodology, sampling 
or framework; (2) dealt primarily with television and phone 
book advertising, which were not at issue; and (3) only two 
pages of the more than 100 focused on direct-mail 
solicitation.260  He concluded by saying that the “few pages of 
self-serving and unsupported statements by the State” should 
have been clearly insufficient to “demonstrate that a regulation 
directly and materially advances the elimination of a real 
 
257 Id. 
258 The report did include “excerpts from complaints of 
direct-mail recipients,” id. at 627, some of whom complained 
about solicitation in the wake of an injury or accident, but the 
Bar presented no evidence that a solicitation ban only in the 
first 30 days after an accident would do anything to mitigate 
these complaints. Additionally, the comments included 
favorable statements about direct mail solicitation as well. Id. 
at 641. 
259 Id. at 640 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 
260 Id. at 640–41 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (“[N]o actual 
surveys, few indications of sample size or selection 
procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no 
discussion of excluded results [were presented]. . . . [N]o 
description of the statistical universe or scientific framework 
that permits any productive use of the information [was 
presented].”). 
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harm.”261 Yet the Court upheld the statute on the basis of this 
evidence.262  
 
Even if we view the supporting evidence in Florida Bar in the 
most favorable light possible, we still conclude that the City 
has made a stronger evidentiary showing here. The studies 
presented by the City address the specific issue that the 
Ordinance was enacted to remedy—discriminatory wage gaps. 
And, unlike the study before the Court in Florida Bar, the 
studies the City relied upon are peer-reviewed research studies, 
many of which were meta-studies that summarized the findings 
of hundreds of other such studies.263 The studies support the 
City’s conclusion that the wage gap is not attributable to 
“legitimate” factors such as education, experience or 
qualifications.264 Moreover,  researchers’ conclusions that 
discrimination is the likely cause of the gaps has been present 
in the academic literature for decades.265 The conclusion that 
the wage gap is most likely the result of discrimination is also 
consistent with voluminous unrebutted independent evidence 
of workplace discrimination.266   
 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 641. 
263 See, e.g., Stanley & Jarrell (meta-analysis of more than 50 
studies investigating the wage gaps). 
264 See, e.g., id. at 948 (concluding there is a “wide consensus 
that gender wage discrimination exists” and the “vast 
empirical economic literature, containing hundreds of studies, 
reveals that women are ‘underpaid’ disproportionate to their 
observed skills”). 
265 See, e.g., Blau & Kahn at 32 (finding from 1980 to 2010, 
“an unexplained gender wage gap in each year[’s data],” and 
explaining that the “finding of such an unexplained gap is 
fairly standard in the literature” and is “taken as an estimate 
of labor market discrimination”). 
266 See e.g., Arin N. Reeves, “Written in Black and White: 
Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized Perceptions of 
Writing Skills,” Nextions Yellow Paper Series (2014) 
(concluding from the results of a controlled experiment on 
law firm partners reviewing an identical memo from African-
American Thomas Meyer and Caucasian Thomas Meyer that 
the greater number of negative comments and a .9 reduction 
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The Chamber also cites our decision in King v. Governor of the 
State of New Jersey267 as another case in which the legislature 
presented substantial evidence to support a law. The Chamber 
argues, unconvincingly, that the showing in King was more 
robust than the City’s evidentiary showing here. In King, we 
upheld a New Jersey law prohibiting sexual orientation change 
efforts (“SOCE”) therapy to persons under the age of 18 over 
a challenge by individuals and organizations providing such 
counseling.268  
 
 
in score on a scale of 5 for African-American Thomas Meyer 
was the result of “commonly held racially-based perceptions 
about writing ability . . . unconsciously impact [law firm 
partners’] ability to objectively evaluate a lawyer’s writing. 
Most of the perceptions uncovered in research thus far 
indicate that commonly held perceptions are biased against 
African Americans and in favor of Caucasians.”). The results 
of this controlled experiment are consistent with others like it 
conducted in various fields designed to ensure that the only 
variable that could explain the more positive reaction to 
White employees was the perceived race or gender of the 
person they were being compared to. In a similar, well 
publicized experiment published under the title: “Are Emily 
and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field 
Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,” researchers 
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan of the 
University of Chicago and MIT, found “large racial 
differences in callback rates. Applicants with White names 
need[ed] to send about 10 resumes to get one callback 
whereas applicants with African-American names need[ed] to 
send about 15.” The fictional White applicant therefore had a 
50 percent greater probability of getting a call back than the 
fictional African-American applicant. Marianne Bertrand & 
Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor 
Market Discrimination, NBER Working Paper No. 9873, 
National Bureau for Economic Research (2003), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.pdf. 
267 767 F.3d at 216. 
268 Id. at 221. 
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The legislative record there “demonstrate[d] that over the last 
few decades a number of well-known, reputable professional 
and scientific organizations ha[d] publicly condemned the 
practice of SOCE.”269 And we, in reviewing that record, 
specifically noted that the American Psychological 
Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the 
Pan American Health Organization “have warned of the ‘great’ 
or ‘serious’ health risks accompanying SOCE counseling, 
including depression, anxiety, self-destructive behavior, and 
suicidality.”270 We also noted, “[m]any such organizations 
have also concluded that there is no credible evidence that 
SOCE counseling is effective.”271 
 
We also found, that “the bulk of empirical evidence regarding 
the . . . harmfulness of SOCE counseling currently falls short 
of the demanding standard imposed by the scientific 
community.”272 We recognized there was a “limited amount of 
methodologically sound research” on the counseling and that 
“the few early research investigations . . . refus[ed] to make a 
definitive statement about whether SOCE is safe or harmful . . 
. due to a lack of scientifically rigorous studies.”273 
Nevertheless, we concluded the legislature was not 
“constitutionally require[d] to wait for conclusive scientific 
evidence before acting to protect its citizens from serious 
threats of harm.”274 Instead, we were convinced by the 
legislature’s “highly plausible” judgment that SOCE could be 
harmful to minors, and concluded that the statute “directly 
advanced” New Jersey’s stated interest.275 
 
Here, the district court concluded that many of the studies cited 
by the City did not conclusively prove that discrimination is 
the sole cause of the wage gap. That level of certainty is not 
required.  The City made a well-reasoned judgment based on 
the testimony presented to it and the unrefuted existence of the 
wage gap that banning wage history inquiries would prevent 
 
269 Id. at 238. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 239. 
273 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 239. 
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further perpetuation of gender and race discrimination in this 
context.  
 
Moreover, we won’t ignore the fact that the very nature of 
discrimination in employment is such that showing 
discrimination by negative inference is often necessary. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized in the context of gender 
discrimination in the workplace, “[a]s should be apparent, the 
entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is 
to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of 
intentional discrimination is hard to come by.”276 We, too, 
have previously recognized, “the instances in which employers 
. . . openly [discriminate against] employees appear to be 
declining. Regrettably, however, this in no way suggests that 
discrimination based upon an individual’s race, gender, or age 
is near an end.”277 “It has become easier to coat various forms 
of discrimination with the appearance of propriety, or to 
ascribe some other less odious intention to what is in reality 
discriminatory behavior.”278  
 
Accordingly, demonstrating discrimination by controlling for 
legitimate factors like education, training, experience, age, 
skills, and other factors that could otherwise “legitimately” 
explain wage gaps, and through experimental evidence, are 
essential means of showing discrimination.  Because “direct 
evidence . . . is hard to come by,” negative inferences can be 
persuasive evidence of discrimination, especially where they 
are entirely unrebutted.279 
 
 
276 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) 
superseded by statute as stated in Burrage v. U.S., 571 U.S. 
204, 214 n. 4 (2014) (permitting a showing that 
discrimination was a “motivating” or “substantial factor to 
shift the burden of persuasion to the employer, which was 
made moot after Congress amended the statute to remove but-
for causality). 
277 Aman v. Cort Furniture, 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
278 Id. at 1082 (emphasis added). 
279 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 272. 
 
 61 
 
As some of the studies on subliminal or implicit bias which we 
have discussed establish, bias is often not even something that 
that the actor is aware of.280 This makes it exceedingly difficult 
to address such issues as wage disparity because simply 
educating employers about the pay gap will not deter an 
employer who is not even aware of the fact that s/he is setting 
a discriminatory salary. Indeed, without challenging the 
existence of the pay gap, the CEO for the Chamber without 
pause admitted that Chamber members gain a “better 
understanding of whether a candidate is worth pursuing based 
on previous compensation.” Consequently, as the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth circuit recognized in in Rizo v. Yovino, 
and as the Managing Attorney for the Women’s Law Project, 
Ms. Fromson, testified here, criteria that may at first appear to 
be race and gender neutral (such as wage history) may be 
proxies for race or gender. 
   
d. The Inquiry Provision is Not More 
Extensive Than Necessary 
 
“The last step of the Central Hudson analysis complements the 
third step, asking whether the speech restriction is not more 
extensive than necessary to serve the interests that support 
it.”281 However, “‘the least restrictive means’ is not the 
standard; instead, the case law requires a reasonable ‘fit 
between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to 
accomplish those ends, . . . a means narrowly tailored to 
achieve the desired objective.’”282 The “scope” of the law must 
be “in proportion to the interest served.”283 The Court does not 
 
280 For a thorough discussion of the prevalence and impact of 
such subliminal bias, see Mahzarin R. Banaji and Anthony G. 
Greenwald, Blind Spot: Hidden Biases of Good People 
(2013). 
281 Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
282 Id. (citing Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 632). 
283 Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 
U.S. 469, 479–80 (1989) (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 
203 (1982)); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 
(2017) (“[t]he regulatory technique may extend only as far as 
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“impose upon [regulators] the burden of demonstrating that . . 
. the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will 
achieve the desired end.”284 Instead, the legislation must 
provide “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable;” 
one that “represents not necessarily the single best disposition” 
but a “proportion[ate]” one.285 Understandably, the district 
court here did not reach the third or fourth prong of the Central 
Hudson inquiry because it found that the Ordinance failed 
under prong two.  
 
However, the last two prongs “are not entirely discrete.”286 
These two prongs “have been considered, somewhat in 
tandem, [as courts must] determine if there is a sufficient ‘fit 
between the [regulator’s] ends and the means chosen to 
accomplish those ends[.]’”287 Given our conclusion that the 
City has satisfied its burden of establishing the relationship 
between the legislative objective of mitigating the wage-gap 
and the remedy afforded by the Inquiry Provision,  we will 
address the fourth prong. 
 
The Inquiry Provision is narrowly tailored. It only prohibits 
employers from inquiring about a single topic, while leaving 
employers free to ask a wide range of other questions, 
including qualifications, work history, skills and any other job-
related questions relevant to performance or fit with the 
 
the interest it serves.”) (citing Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 
565). 
284 Board of Trustees, 492 U.S. at 480. 
285 Id. The Court does not invalidate a commercial speech 
restriction “that went only marginally beyond what would 
adequately have served the governmental interest,” rather 
“almost all of the restrictions disallowed under Central 
Hudson’s fourth prong have been substantially excessive . . . 
.” Id. at 479. 
286 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999). 
287 Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 
134 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Puerto Rico Assocs. 
478 U.S. at 341). 
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company.288 Additionally, the provision does not prohibit 
employers from obtaining market salary information from 
other sources. The Ordinance simply seeks to insulate any 
discriminatory impact of prior salary levels on subsequent 
wages.  The Ordinance is thus more narrowly tailored than 
similar wage history Ordinances that have been passed since 
2017.289 As enacted, it simply prohibits employers from 
inquiring about wage history at a specific point in time—after 
a prospective employee has applied for a job and before s/he is 
hired and a wage is set—when the City has determined that the 
risk is greatest for conduct that perpetuates discrimination. 
Moreover, applicants can voluntarily provide salary history if 
they feel it is in their best interest.290 
 
The Chamber argues that the Ordinance is not sufficiently 
tailored because it indisputably “regulate[s] speech that poses 
no danger to the asserted [governmental] interest.”291 
According to the Chamber, the Ordinance does not achieve its 
interest “when it is applied to White male job applicants, whose 
salaries the City acknowledges are not tainted by past 
 
288 We caution, however, that, as the discussion of the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Rizo makes clear, some 
questions may raise the specter of a wage inquiry, even 
though not expressed in so many words.  
289 See e.g., H’rg Tr., at 15–16 (“Actually, the Massachusetts 
law goes a little wider than we do. We’re trying to keep it real 
basic, and I think you’ll hear from a witness that thinks we 
don’t make it strong enough, but we’re trying to find that 
great balance that we always try to in legislation and at least 
at this point limit it to stopping the employer from asking, 
directly asking, the prospective employee what they make. 
Massachusetts law goes a little farther as far as how far the 
employer can inquire, and we’re not ready to go there yet and 
we think that could have added more controversy to the bill. . 
. . [W]e want to try to keep it real basic as far as the inquiry of 
past wages.”).  
290 This, of course, does not suggest that an employer can 
goad or cajole an employee into disclosing prior wages or 
salary.  
291 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565. 
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discrimination.”292 At oral argument, the Chamber even went 
so far as to argue that the Ordinance should therefore not apply 
to White men. The suggestion was offered in all seriousness, 
and it shows the difficulty of, and very limited avenues for, 
addressing this persistent problem.  
 
Counsel for the Chamber actually suggested that the City set 
up a system in which employers are free to ask salary histories 
of White male job applicants but are precluded from doing the 
same for women and minorities. Aside from the clear equal 
protection implications, the suggestion for such a carve-out 
fails to understand the nature of the wage gap. As amici point 
out, a system that perpetuates higher salaries for men based on 
their higher salary histories is no better than one that 
perpetuates lower salaries for women and minorities based on 
their lower salary histories.293 Indeed, it is the very same 
system. Asking White men their prior salary and allowing it to 
impact an offer of employment would ensure that the historic 
salary advantage enjoyed by White males would continue. 
Employers operating under such a scheme would unwittingly 
be helping White males to continue to enjoy salary advantages 
on new jobs because they would be carried over from their 
prior jobs. 
 
More importantly, even were we to credit the Chamber’s 
suggestion, we would nevertheless not be free to ignore the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Bar where the Court 
considered and rejected a similar overbreadth argument. The 
Respondents in Florida Bar argued that the ban on 
communications to all accident victims within 30 days of an 
accident was overbroad because it did not distinguish between 
those whom the provision was aiming to protect—injury 
victims who were especially vulnerable—and “those accident 
victims who are ready, willing and able to utilize a lawyer’s 
advice.”294 Rather than require the Bar Association to “draw[] 
difficult lines,” the Court concluded that the blanket “ban 
applicable to all post-accident or disaster solicitations for a 
brief 30–day period” was sufficiently narrowly tailored.295  
 
292 Chamber Br. at 55. 
293 See Br. of Amicus City of NY et al. 
294 515 U.S. at 632. 
295 Id. at 633. 
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Thus, even if we were to credit the Chamber’s argument that 
the law is overbroad, it would not prevent the Inquiry Provision 
from surviving intermediate scrutiny.  The Supreme Court has 
refused to invalidate restrictions on commercial speech “that 
[go] only marginally beyond what would adequately have 
served the governmental interest.”296 We have no trouble 
concluding that the City has demonstrated a “proportionate” fit 
between its substantial interest and its legislative attempt to 
advance that interest.  
 
The Chamber also argues that “underinclusiveness plagues the 
Ordinance. Despite the City’s assumption that the wage history 
of female and minority applicants is ‘tainted’ by past 
discrimination, the Ordinance permits employers to base a 
salary offer on wage-history information that an applicant 
voluntarily discloses.”297 However, underinclusiveness is only 
important to our inquiry if it “raises serious doubts about 
whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it 
invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or 
viewpoint.”298 There is no suggestion of such insincerity here. 
Moreover, the alleged underinclusiveness is more of a strength 
than an infirmity. It allows a female or minority who may have 
historically been paid above the normal salary levels because 
of extraordinary qualifications to inform a potential employer 
of that salary history rather than remain silent and risk 
forfeiting the higher salary that s/he may well deserve.    
 
 
296 Fox, 492 U.S. at 479. 
297 Chamber Br. at 57-58. 
298 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 801–02 
(2011). See also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387 (“[T]he First 
Amendment imposes not an ‘underinclusiveness’ limitation 
but a ‘content discrimination’ limitation upon a State’s 
prohibition of proscribable speech. There is no problem 
whatever, for example, with a State’s prohibiting obscenity 
(and other forms of proscribable expression) only in certain 
media or markets, for although that prohibition would be 
‘underinclusive,’ it would not discriminate on the basis of 
content.”). 
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Even when this is not the case, Central Hudson does not 
require that the Ordinance “redress the harm completely.”299 
The City may choose to regulate only “part” of the speech that 
causes harm.300 Here, as part of the regulatory scheme, the City 
has chosen to allow owners of their own prior salary data to 
remain in control of that information and thereby allow the 
employee to decide whether s/he wants to disclose it.  
 
The Chamber also suggests that more rigorous enforcement of 
current antidiscrimination laws is an alternative that the City 
must attempt before passing an Ordinance such as this. 
Intermediate scrutiny, however, does not require that the City 
adopt such regulatory measures only as a last alternative or that 
the City demonstrate that the legislation is the least restrictive 
response.301 Moreover, it is clear on this record and from some 
of the cases we have discussed (see Rizo) that the wage gap has 
survived other remedial measures, including the Equal Pay 
Act.302 The testimony supporting the Inquiry Provision 
establishes that, despite the presence of antidiscrimination 
laws, that “[t]he gender wage gap has narrowed by less than 
one-half a penny per year in the United States since 1963.”303 
 
299 Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 774 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
300 Id. 
301 See Fox, 492 U.S. at 476–78.   
302 The Chamber also cited to our recent decision in Bank of 
Hope in its Rule 28(j) letter to argue that the City was 
required to attempt a host of other alternatives before 
implementing the Ordinance. Central Hudson scrutiny does 
not require the City to adopt the least restrictive means to 
achieve its goal. Moreover, in Bank of Hope v. Miye Choni, 
938 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2019). We concluded that there 
“neither the magistrate judge nor the district court considered 
a single alternative.” Id. at 396. In contrast, the City here, 
considered and appropriately rejected a number of 
alternatives, including the patently deficient alternatives 
suggested by the Chamber, such as simply enforcing current 
antidiscrimination laws, which have been insufficient to 
meaningfully close the wage gap.   
303 § 9-1131(1); see also JA299-300 (summarizing testimony 
before the City regarding existing laws that have 
insufficiently closed the pay gap). 
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The City enacted the Inquiry Provision in an attempt to address 
this persistent problem and the record is clearly sufficient to 
withstand this First Amendment challenge to it.  
  
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s 
denial of a preliminary injunction as to the Reliance Provision 
and we will vacate the district court’s grant of a preliminary 
injunction as to the Inquiry Provision and remand with 
directions to the district court to deny the preliminary 
injunction as to the Inquiry Provision.  
